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ELISA BELLÈ, CATERINA PERONI, ELISA RAPETTI*
Fighting about (Sexual) Citizenship:  
Italy’s “Nature or Culture” Dilemma
Recent public debate in Italy has been noteworthy for its renewed focus on issues of 
gender and sexual citizenship. The discussion is well summarized and symbolized 
by two opposing political discourses that have been engaged in a lengthy struggle. 
On one side stands a neo -conservative Catholic movement that opposes the recogni-
tion of LGBTQ relationships and defends “the natural family”. On the other side there 
are the LGBTQ movements, which are claiming full civil, social and sexual citizenship. 
The present article analyzes this conflict, which was clearly illustrated by two public 
events held in Rome in June 2015 (Family Day and the Rome LGBTQ Pride). The paper, 
methodologically based on Critical Discourse Analysis, examines the most relevant politi-
cal documents (manifestos and press releases) issued by the organizers of the two 
demonstrations, highlighting the existence of ambivalent discourses on the naturaliza-
tion of sex and the universalization of social and sexual citizenship.
Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis; gender identity; Italy; LGBT movement; sexual 
citizenship.
Introduction
Recent public debate in Italy has recently been noteworthy for its renewed 
focus on issues of gender and sexual citizenship. More specifically, in the 
past few years – and especially since 2013 – it has been fuelled by three 
draft laws that were intended to bring about recognition of partnerships 
and marriages between same -sex couples (the Cirinnà Bill, 2013),1 educa-
tional programs on gender relations in schools (the Fedeli Bill, 2014) and 
the introduction of the crime of homophobia into the law (the Scalfarotto 
Bill, 2013).
* This article is an entirely collaborative effort by the three authors, whose names appear in alpha-
betical order. If, however, for academic reasons individual responsibility is to be assigned, Elisa 
Bellè wrote section 4, 6, and part of section 7, Caterina Peroni wrote section 1 and section 5; 
Elisa Rapetti wrote the introduction, section 2, 3, and part of section 7.
1 In the Italian context, the surname attached to a law is that of its first signatory.
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These three proposals were developed in the context of a peculiar and 
contradictory political context. It must first be observed that recognition 
of same -sex partnerships and marriages has reappeared on the political 
agenda in Italy following a relatively long series of unsuccessful attempts 
by the center -left parties – particularly between 2005 and 2008 – to put it 
there (for a detailed reconstruction of the political debate, see Ozzano and 
Giorgi, 2015). Secondly, the debate on the introduction of educational 
programs on gender relations, bullying and homophobia grew in intensity 
following the dissemination of a 2012 publication for primary and secondary 
schools, distributed to schools by a public body (the National Office against 
Racial Discrimination – UNAR)2 and aimed at fighting sexual discrimina-
tion and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. 
This publication generated considerable controversy and is still at the 
center of a significant political and cultural conflict, waged for the most 
part by Catholic associations and groups both in the media and in schools. 
Thirdly, despite institutional pressures from the European Union, Italy 
remains one of the few Western countries that have not adopted LGBT 
anti -discrimination policies and forms of legal recognition of same sex 
unions (di Feliciantonio, 2015). Indeed, even for heterosexual couples, the 
only form of public recognition is marriage.
In spite of this evident impasse in the institutional and political spheres, 
it is important to point out that public opinion has changed somewhat 
during this period; in fact, Italian society seems to be becoming increas-
ingly open to recognizing the rights and legitimacy of LGBT identity and 
affectivity (ISTAT, 2012). 
The current public position on gender and sexual citizenship therefore 
seems ambivalent, characterized as it is by both the emergence of a new 
openness and the persistence of conservative positions. This article seeks 
to deal with this complexity and ambivalence by focusing on an analysis 
of two specific public events relating to this debate. The first of these is 
the demonstration known as Family Day (held in Rome on 20 June 2015), 
promoted by conservative Catholic groups with two main aims: to safeguard 
marriage between a man and a woman as the only legitimate and “natural” 
solution, and to “protect” children from the dangers of Gender Ideology, 
which “confuses the natural complementarity of masculinity and feminin-
ity”. The second is Rome LGBT Pride (held on 13 June 2015), an event 
characterized by two main elements: the identity claim, which is historically 
a fundamental aspect of the Pride parades (to publicly declare and manifest 
2 Accessed on 08.04.2016, at http://www.istitutobeck.com/progetto -unar.html.
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pride in the individual and collective LGBT identity), and the rights -related 
claim for recognition of civil and social rights.
In order to explore these two events, we decided to focus our analysis 
on the official statements (press releases and political manifestos) issued by 
the organizing committees of the Family Day and Onda Pride. We adopted the 
general framework and methods of Critical Discourse Analysis – CDA (van 
Dijk, 1993; Fairclough, 2001).
In the sections that follow, we first describe our theoretical framework, 
which is principally based on feminist literature dealing with security as 
a new regulatory paradigm (Simone, 2010; Pitch, 2013) in relation to 
a patriarchal, hetero normative social order that tends to criminalize non-
-hetero normative perspectives, behaviors and organizations as a public 
threat and as “folk devils” that cause sexual (and social) panic (Herdt, 2009). 
Next we present the research methodology, after which we provide a more 
detailed description of the Italian socio political context and the genesis 
of the two public events, and reconstruct the complex composition of the 
organizing Committees.
We dedicate an empirical section to each event, focusing on the discur-
sive strategies of the two sides. In the final section we compare the two 
discourses in order to illustrate the complex ways in which they intertwine 
and the mutual construction derived from a shared socio political context, 
although with different forms of discursive power and social legitimization.
1. The Nature of Citizenship. Sexual Panics and Folk Devils Fighting Back
In past decades, one feature of the Italian political and public debate has 
been a series of waves of moral panic. The consequence of these surges of 
rhetorical and normative social alarm has been the criminalizing of “devi-
ant bodies” (the young, immigrants and sex workers) as “folk devils” who 
have disturbed the lives of normal Italian citizens (Pitch, 2013; Simone, 
2010), and the construction of Italian women as victims (Woodcock, 2010). 
As a number of feminist and critical scholars have argued, the aim of the 
process of victimization of Italian women was to establish a clear model 
of the “respectable woman” (the good victim who does not deserve to be 
raped), and thus to control women’s sexuality and freedom (Peroni, 2014). 
In fact, in Italy’s Catholic culture this symbolic use of women’s bodies in 
the context of moral panic helps to affirm a “natural”, straight sexuality 
and consequently the hetero normative social order (Simone, 2010). The 
security rhetoric and populism used by political leaders (on both the left 
and right) have enforced a division between straight and deviant sexualities 
in the name of defending the normal, hetero normative family.
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If the construction of respectable women as the “good” victims is used 
to reaffirm the hetero normative social order, the consequence of this is the 
blaming and criminalization of non -hetero -normative behaviors by women 
and LGBTQ people as deviant sexualities (Rubin, 1984; Peroni, 2015). 
In this context, the sexualization of scapegoats mobilizes public opinion 
(that is, respectable citizens) against deviant and non -conformist subjects, 
producing what Herdt (2009) calls “sexual panic”. According to Herdt 
(ibidem: 5), “sexual ‘folk devils’ – the sexual other, whether oversexed 
or undersexed – are stripped of their rights, and the cultural imagination 
becomes obsessed with anxieties over what this evil sexuality will do to 
warp society and future generations”. In this sexual panic, the symbolic and 
cultural exclusion of sexualized “others” involves specific exclusion from 
“universally” recognized citizenship rights (Seidman, 2001).
In other words, we are witnessing a new wave of conservative moral 
ideology whose aim is the social exclusion of non -conformist sexualities 
in order to defend the heterosexual family and social order. This brand of 
neoconservatism incites sexual panic at the civil, social and cultural level, 
which are tightly intertwined and deeply embedded in a political definition 
of the nature/culture, sex/gender dichotomies.
Nature lies at the core of the entire theoretical architecture of the con-
temporary neoconservative moral and sexual panic. The attack on so -called 
Gender Ideology, a label invented and used by French and Italian Catholic 
organizations in the late 1990s to discredit Gender and Women’s Studies, 
reflects the neo conservative opposition to the idea of gender as a social, 
cultural and heteronormative construction of sexed bodies (Garbagnoli, 
2014). For these groups and their theorists, Gender Ideology is the distor-
tion of the only true natural scientific definition of gender elaborated by 
Vatican theologians, for whom gender is “the transcendent dimension of 
human sexuality conforming to the natural order that is already present 
in the body” (Vollmer Coles apud Garbagnoli, 2014: 256). 
The spectre of Gender Ideology is used to mobilize the most profound 
fears expressed by “straight” heterosexual and “traditional” families of the 
danger posed by gender and gender educational programs in primary and 
secondary schools. What needs to be defended is a supposed “childhood 
innocence” and a (heterosexual) parent’s natural right to decide on their 
children’s education (Robinson, 2008). The job of the contemporary family, 
according to Foucault (2003), is to preserve and control the “innocence” 
and “asexual nature” of children by limiting and supervising every inter-
mediary in the education process, such as teachers, and to become the hub 
of childhood sexual and medical control. “This centralization of education 
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of and control over children in the nuclear family functions as a source of 
normalization” (ibidem: 254).
Indeed, the hetero normative family to which neo conservatives refer is 
also natural, meaning that it consists of a father, a mother and children. 
Here, “nature” is based on an essentialist perspective which fixes gender 
roles within a naturalizing process in binary sexed bodies – mother/woman, 
father/man – that in turn is viewed as the only possible, legitimate and 
proper form of reproductive relationship. The naturalization of the sexes 
also implies the deterministic fact that, for neo -conservatives, there is no 
social construction of roles, and that to be a mother or a father is respectively 
the lot of a woman and a man.
Gender Ideology is the ultimate expression of the Vatican’s attack on 
feminist and queer theories that deconstruct gender roles and stereotypes, 
the traditional family and the heteronormative social order in general. 
As Garbagnoli (2014: 256, translated by the authors) argues, “what disturbs 
the Vatican (and the guardians of the sexual order) is not gender itself – 
which can be (and often is) used as a synonym for “women” in the sense of 
a natural group – but the critical potential (the “critical edge”, in the words 
of Scott, 1986) of an analytical category that denaturalizes the sexual order, 
which is a part of the domination of social relationships”. The real target of 
the neoconservative attacks seems to be the process of emancipation and 
self -determination that these movements have made possible for the last 
thirty years. The neo conservative sexual panic in relation to Gender Ideology 
includes gender education in schools, the public debate on same -sex mar-
riages and the legal criminalization of homo - and transphobia. 
Despite the conflation of gender and feminist studies by neo conservatives, 
the fact is that feminist and queer theories offer different perspectives, due 
to the complexity of the approaches and strategies that have historically 
been adopted in their claims. These approaches and their strategies are 
closely associated with and depend on an immanent perspective based 
on the real social and political context in which they are developed. 
The first LGBT movements, which were born after the Stonewall riots, 
posed a radical challenge to the heteronormative order by criticizing the 
idea of “naturalization” and the biological origin of sexual orientation. 
Nature was seen as a deterministic and normative device that defined the 
distinction between sexual normality and deviance. Today, the strategic 
lexicon used by a part of the LGBTQ movements has shifted significantly, 
and is now directed towards the epistemic dimension of universality. 
This is a two -pronged strategy that seeks, on the one hand, to obtain recog-
nition of the same rights of heteronormative individuals and, on the other, 
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to be socially accepted for a supposed “naturalness” of differences that is 
common to all human beings (Croce, 2015).
The question of human rights has become the main frame of reference 
for this area of the LGBTQ movements, with the result that the conflict 
potential of sexual orientation and identity differences that lay at the 
heart of early LGBTQ movements has been eclipsed and has led to a sort 
of “homo -normative” process, especially with regard to the recognition of 
same -sex marriage (Polikoff, 1993; Brandzel, 2005; Croce, 2015). Indeed, 
the term “human rights” belongs to the semantic field of universality, which 
has historically been used by positivist theorists to define the abstract sub-
ject of rights – and science – in Western societies since the 16th century. 
According to feminist theories, this ideal subject conceals the real nature 
of the Western secular subject (male, white, proprietor, and so on), thereby 
mystifying the structural asymmetries of power between men, women, and 
all gender subjectivities (Alcoff and Potter, 1993). 
On the other hand, radical LGBTQ groups still criticize any demands 
for assimilation to hetero normative rights that exclude all forms of incom-
patibility with the nuclear, binary, monogamist couple and claim self-
-determination and civil and social rights for everyone, regardless of sexual 
orientation and identity (Seidman, 2001; Croce, 2015). 
However, it is precisely on this issue between nature and culture and 
between universalization and difference that the conflict between neo-
conservatives and the LGBTQ movements, as well as within the LGBTQ 
movements themselves, remains open. To quote McRobbie and Thornton 
(1995), folk devils do fight back, and are continuously challenging the 
heteronormative social order.
2. Research Methodology
This paper analyzes the political and public discourse of the actors who 
promoted two public events that exemplify the debate described above: 
Family Day, a demonstration promoted by groups associated with Catholic 
values that took place in Rome on 20 June 2015; and the Rome LGBT 
Parade,3 which was held on 13 June 2015.4 The LGBT Onda Pride rallies 
were held in fifteen northern and southern Italian cities: the first was in 
3 We refer to the “Pride Parade” by the acronym “LGBTQ” because it represents the most inclusive 
concept. We decided to exclude the I (Intersexual) category because we do not discuss this issue 
in the present contribution. We are aware that the promoters, the mass media and common usage 
favor other terms, such as Gay Pride, and (since 2015) Human Pride. In the section 5 we use the 
extended acronym LGBTQI because we literary cite the official documents, which use this label.
4 Accessed on 21.07.2015, at http://ondapride.it/.
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Verona on 6 June 2015 and the last on 1 August 2015 in Reggio Emilia. 
From a methodological point of view, our analysis focuses on the Rome 
Parade for three reasons: 1) because of its national relevance in the Italian 
context – its particular significance in political, media and symbolic terms 
stemming from the fact that it is the Capital’s Pride parade (Mudu, 2002); 
2) because in terms of location it allows comparison with the Family Day 
event (Family Day, as we have already noted, was also held in Rome), and 
3) because of the national importance of both demonstrations.5 
In order to explore the two events, after consulting the documents and 
materials available on their respective websites and newspapers of vary-
ing political orientations, we decided to focus our analysis on the official 
statements drafted by the organizing committees with the aim of getting 
people involved in the demonstrations and enhancing their claims in the 
public and political arenas. More specifically, we first focused on two press 
releases issued by the Family Day promoters (dated 8 and 18 June 2015). 
The Family Day organizing committee did not produce a political mani-
festo, but the press releases can be used as the principal support documents 
for the demonstration. We then analyzed the two manifestos prepared by 
the LGBT Pride organizers: the national one, which offers an overview of 
the Italian LGBT movement, and the local one – entitled “Liberiamoci!” 
(“Let’s Be Free!”) – which was issued by the local organizing committee 
and allowed us to contextualize the event in its local area while permitting 
the identification of the crucial elements needed to interpret the Rome 
demonstration. As the following sections will show, the LGBT Pride is 
made up of separate but interconnected positions, while the Family Day 
promoters – who have a diverse set of priorities – represent themselves from 
a more uniform standpoint. The decision to use direct sources has allowed 
us to study (self)representations in the discourses of the organizers and to 
ensure the methodological comparability of the sources under analysis.
According to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) methodology, languages 
are “an integral element  of the material social process” (Fairclough, 2001: 
122) that permits a focus on the interaction (dialectical process) between 
structure and action. Therefore, “if the discourse is defined in terms of 
5 Although numbers are not the most important criterion for defining the importance of a demon-
stration, we should mention that some hundreds of thousands of people participated to each of the 
two events. It has not been possible to find conclusive data on the number of participants: the Family 
Day organizers reported that there were a million attendees, while the Rome police said there were 
400,000. The Rome Pride promoters first said that 200,000 people were in attendance, and at the 
end of the day 500,000. Data from the Rome police are not available on the web. Account should 
be taken of the fact that LGBTQ Pride parades took place in several Italian cities – although not 
all on the same day – and the participants were more widely spread around the various locations.
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complex communicative events, access and control may be defined both 
for the context and for the structures of text and talk themselves” (van Dijk, 
2001: 356). Using this perspective as our starting point, we present the 
context6 in which meaning was first constructed. Later (in the following 
two sections) we give an account of the Italian public debate on LGBTQ 
rights and gender education (social problems) and analyze the social 
interaction and conflicts among the beliefs of different actors, focusing on 
two sample events. Our analysis centers on the self -representation strategy 
of the actors involved, their claims and argumentation strategies (includ-
ing language). Finally we identify the frames of reference used and their 
respective dialectical process.
3. Research Context
In accordance with the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 
we start out by describing the social and cultural context of the public debate 
and the genealogy of the two selected events. Firstly, it is important to note 
that the Family Day and LGBTQ Parade have quite different histories. 
In fact, prior to 2015, Family Day had taken place on a national scale just 
once, in 2007. That particular event had been organized to protest against 
a draft law that recognized rights and duties in the partnerships of same-
-sex couples (the Bindi -Pollastrini Bill, 2007). The promoters of the 2007 
Family Day (Il Forum delle Associazioni Familiari – the Forum of Family 
Associations) and their representatives made explicit reference to Catholic 
movements and values. None of the organizations that promoted the 2015 
Family Day were among the associations that had participated in the event’s 
first edition.
By contrast, LGBTQ Pride has a longer tradition of demonstrating and 
more continuity as regards the groups that promote and take part in it. 
The Parade has been organized on an annual basis since 1994 in collabora-
tion with the international LGBTQ movement. In addition, since 2013, 
the Italian Pride Parades, which are held in various cities across the coun-
try, have come together into what has been called “Onda Pride”, a series 
of demonstrations in a number of different cities that converge behind a 
single logo.
6 “Context is defined as the mentally represented structure of those properties of the social situation 
that are relevant for the production or comprehension of discourse. It consists of such categories 
as the overall definition of the situation, setting (time, place), ongoing actions (including discourses 
and discourse genres), participants in various communicative, social, or institutional roles, as well 
as their mental representations: goals, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and ideologies” (van Dijk, 
2001: 356).
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Moreover, as mentioned before, we decided to focus on these events 
because they can be considered as emblematic of the views held by a variety 
of collective subjects (associations and groups) in regards to three important 
issues in the public debate on the recognition of partnerships and marriages 
of same -sex couples, the institutionalization of gender education programs 
and the inclusion of the crime of homophobia into the national laws. 
The organizing committee of Family Day, Defending Our Children 
(Difendiamo i Nostri Figli),7 was formed on 2 June 2015 and is comprised 
of members of various Catholic organizations sharing the same or similar 
aims, claims and arguments. Its main objectives are the safeguarding of 
marriage between a man and a woman as the only possible solution, and the 
protection of children against the dangers of Gender Ideology and a society 
that confuses gender roles and fails to follow natural laws. More specifically, 
the eleven members of the organizing committee participate in the debates 
in their capacity as professionals (e.g., the committee’s spokesperson is 
a neuro psychiatrist and its members include lawyers and teachers) and as 
journalists and/or members of various organizations involved in the public 
debate on LGBTQ rights and gender education programs for schools. 
The committee’s website lists its members by name, but does not refer to 
the organizations in which, in the majority of cases, they play a significant 
role. It is unclear, therefore, whether they are only speaking in their own 
name or as representatives of their organizations.8
The organizing committee of LGBTQ Pride chose the name Onda Pride9 
(Pride Wave) to emphasize the spread of the event across a number of Italian 
cities, from the South to the North. Its national political manifesto – the 
main slogan of which was “It’s Human Pride”– has been adapted by local 
parade committees to express specific purposes and claims linked to the 
features of each territory. As we will see in the following sections, if one 
compares the nuances of these documents – one of which was prepared 
nationally, the other one at the local (Rome) level –, interesting changes 
emerge (in comparison to previous years) in the political lexicon and the 
strategic claims adopted by the main LGBT groups at the national level, 
due in part to the domestic political, social and cultural context. The com-
position of the Pride Organizing Committee varies from the institutional, 
7 Accessed on 21.07.2015, at http://www.difendiamoinostrifigli.it/.
8 The members of the organizing committee of “Defending Our Children” belong to five main 
organizations: Non Si Tocca la Famiglia (Hands off the Family), La Manif pour Tous (Demo for 
all), Scienza e Vita (Science and Life), Giuristi per la Vita (Lawyers for Life) and Provita (Pro -Life). 
9 Accessed on 21.07.2015, at http://ondapride.it/.
82 | Elisa Bellè, Caterina Peroni, Elisa Rapetti
big associations such as ARCIGAY10 and ARCILESBICA,11 to informal 
LGBTQ groups or collectives active in the cities where Pride parades take 
place. Customarily, trade unions and local left -wing parties also take part.
After this brief description of the context and actors participating in 
the public debate, in the following section we focus on the rhetoric, the 
discourses and the communication strategies of each event’s organizing 
committee.12
4. Family Day: Between Gender Ideology and the Naturalness of Science 
In this section, we focus on the most significant discursive strategies adopted 
by the “Defending Our Children” Committee13 in the promotion of the 
10 ARCIGAY was founded in 1985 and is Italy’s foremost national gay rights organization. In 2007 
its membership exceeded 160,000. It acts as an umbrella organization for 114 (50 political/cultural 
and 64 recreational) local centers across 48 Italian provinces, from Bolzano in the north to Catania 
in the south. Accessed on 31.08.2016, at: http://www.arcigay.it/arcigay -in -english/.
11 ARCILESBICA (Associazione Nazionale) – established in 1996 – is an Italian voluntary body 
that has campaigned for the past twenty years to inform the general public, educate political policy 
and improve the physical, social and psychological conditions of Italian lesbian women, whilst 
contributing to both the Italian and international LGBTQ movement as a whole. ARCILESBICA 
is a national association with several local branches throughout Italy, which help to promote lesbian 
culture and visibility, give personal, legal and psychological support to lesbians, structure and pres-
ent anti -homophobic bullying courses in schools as well as organize political initiatives and media 
campaigns at local level. Accessed on 31.08.2016, at: http://www.arcilesbica.it/about%20us.php.
12 During the process of writing and revising this article, one of the bills mentioned in it (the 
Cirinnà Bill on the recognition of civil union for both homosexual and heterosexual couples) 
has been approved by the Italian Parliament (11 May 2016) with two relevant changes from the 
original proposal (presented to the Senate on 6 October 2015). These two crucial changes were 
the elimination: 1) of so -called stepchild adoption – i.e., the possibility of adopting the children 
of a partner; and 2) of the obligation of marital fidelity. During the institutional discussion, public 
debate was very intense and more and more participants joined in it. Moreover, two events, similar 
to those considered in our analysis, took place in the month of January, again within a short time 
period. A second Family Day took place in Rome on 30 January 2016. A LGBTQ demonstration, 
named “Sveglia Italia! È ora di essere civili” (Wake Up Italy! It’s time to be civilized), took place 
in 99 cities simultaneously on 23 January 2016 (in Rome, a protest camp was organized from 
28 to 30 January). Both events focused on the importance of the symbolic recognition of same 
sex couples, reproducing a debate similar to the one analyzed in these pages. It is interesting to 
note that, perhaps out of concern regarding society’s wide consensus on the law, the Family Day 
organizing committee introduced a controversial element in the public debate that significantly 
affected/influenced the institutional discussion and led to the modification of the law. We allude 
to the so -called surrogate motherhood issue. The representatives of rightist parties argued that 
stepchild adoption was the first step towards the possibility of introducing this practice in Italy 
(where it is still illegal), and invited one of the promoters of the global petition against this prac-
tice, Jennifer Lahl, to speak during their demonstration. Finally, the Family Day Committee, 
the Catholic associations and institutions as well as several members of right -wing parties succeeded 
in eliminating the “marital” fidelity clause in order to avoid the possibility of any symbolic or real 
conflation between civic union (homo or hetero) and marriage.
13 As pointed out in the previous sections, the “Defending Our Children” Committee organized 
and promoted the Family Day demonstration. In this section we are focusing exclusively on the 
texts produced by this Committee in order to promote Family Day.
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Family Day demonstration. It should first be noted that the announce-
ment of the demonstration was generic and “neutral”: in the press release 
announcing the event, the Committee describes itself as 
non -partisan and non -denominational, made up of free citizens who, by giving a voice 
to millions of families in our country, wish to publicly reaffirm the right of parents to 
educate and instruct their sons and daughters freely, especially with regard to issues 
relating to affectivity and sexuality. (Committee press release, 8 June 2015)
Although the meeting was openly Catholic – which is a mere statement 
of fact, considering the participating groups, the network of associations 
represented on the Committee and the speeches made at the end of the 
demonstration – it was the Committee’s communication strategy to refuse 
precise religious identification. This has a dual purpose: on the one hand, 
to sidestep the problematic issue of institutional legitimization by the 
Vatican (which did not take an official position) in order to avoid political 
fractures; and on the other, to establish its independence as a social move-
ment. It also enables a sort of inter religious appeal based on “universal” 
values that can be shared by different creeds. In addition, the non -partisan 
declaration reinforces the message that this is an autonomous entity, 
removed from (and uninfluenced by) partisan political debate.
Consequently, the speaker here is not the Catholic Church, nor is it a 
political party, but “free citizens” who are giving a voice to “millions of 
families […] to the People of the Family, who are concerned about the 
future of our children and grandchildren”. In line with a typical populist 
approach, the Family Day demonstration establishes itself as a synecdoche 
– as a part representing the whole – a synthesis (Incisa di Camerana, 2000) 
of the people, the People of the Family. The most urgent concern afflicting 
the People of the Family, which encompasses profound emotional issues 
such as parental and family love and a commitment to protect “the inno-
cence of children” against moral corruption in the world, is the defense of 
“our children”.
A less emotional, and more abstract, consequence of this appeal is edu-
cational freedom: the absolute centrality of the family and its supremacy 
over the public educational system is strongly affirmed. In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that establishing a connection between the protection 
of childhood and educational freedom is a “classic” conservative argument 
that is also used in other countries in public debates on the civil rights 
of LGBTQ persons and gender education in schools (Robinson, 2008; 
Garbagnoli, 2014).
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Resorting to another typical populist strategy that constructs identities 
based on a “them and us” type of opposition (Mény and Surel, 2002), 
the People of the Family are counterposed to the “non -scientific lobbies” 
behind this “veritable invasion that is concealed within a Gender ideology 
that indoctrinates our children, confusing their psycho -affective growth”. 
The phrase “non -scientific lobbies” is a label that evokes a secretive, 
manipulative, almost eugenic dimension of science. Moreover, as pointed 
out in other contributions on the topic (Garbagnoli, 2014), the capitalized 
use of the English, non -translated word “Gender”, alludes to a type of 
ideological colonization carried out by foreign cultures and societies that 
are far removed from Catholic Mediterranean society (the allusion here is 
to North American “academic” culture in particular).
As a result of this discursive strategy, the sociopolitical fracture between 
those countries that have legislation on same sex unions and those that 
still do not (such as Italy), which is becoming increasingly evident in the 
shared context of the European Union, is resolved in terms of scientific 
delegitimization. It is important to stress the fact that this fissure between 
secularized and traditional countries and the consequent failure on the 
part of the Italian legislature to pass reforms, is one of the most power-
ful arguments used by the Italian LGBTQ movements. By framing the 
issue in terms of cultural colonization by foreign non -scientific lobbies, 
the Committee can take a position against the recognition of same sex 
unions while avoiding the potential danger of being defined in the public 
debate as an obscurantist, anti -modern movement. It is also important to 
point out that the Committee does not mention the issue of homophobia, 
nor does it take an explicit position in the public debate on the bill before 
the national legislature that would make homophobia a crime (although 
several members of the Committee have ties to s overtly involved in the 
struggle against this proposal). The Committee’s silence on the issue is both 
eloquent and strategic. As has already been noted in other contributions 
to discourse analysis, silence is as important as words in terms of the con-
struction of discursive effects, i.e., of what is a part of discourse and what is 
absent in the final output of the process of discursive construction (Bacchi, 
2009). By its silence, the Committee avoids the problem of being labelled as 
“homophobic” (a concept that is being increasingly accepted and used 
in public debate) and shifts attention on the development of a public threat 
while maintaining a public image of calmness and moderation.
The ambivalence of the Committee’s discourse on science is also worthy 
of note. On the one hand, it reduces the scientific context of gender studies 
to a homogeneous front that aims at the ideological colonization of children, 
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family and society under the cover of scientific legitimization. On the other 
hand, it has adopted a measured, sober communicative style, avoiding explicit 
religious references and direct critiques of the LGBTQ movement. Above 
all, the founding members of the Committee tend to be highly educated 
and use their professional status and skills to lend public support to their 
efforts. The Committee’s spokesperson, for example, is a neuropsychiatrist, 
and his professional role and scientific interests are often emphasized in 
public pronouncements: his biographical note on the Committee’s web page 
focuses largely on his education and professional activity as head physician 
at a public hospital.
It is precisely in relation to safeguarding the “psycho -affective growth of 
children” and the right to educate them freely that the second theme of the 
demonstration – that of same -sex unions – is introduced and developed. 
Gender Ideologies (in this case, in the plural) call into question the “foundations 
of the family as defined in our Constitution” (Committee press release, 8 June 
2015).14 These ideologies “are ready to sacrifice the natural right of children 
to grow up with their mums and dads” (ibidem) on the altar of civil rights. 
This discursive strategy connects two themes of the public debate in an 
extremely effective way: gender education in schools compromises children’s 
growth by teaching them that they can “change their gender identity even sev-
eral times in one day” (as we hear in a number of public declarations made by 
members of the Committee), and this educational program in turn legitimizes 
homosexual unions. This linking is an attempt to deal with the cultural and 
social changes that are occurring in the Italian context with regard to both 
issues: the spread of educational programs on gender and affectivity in public 
schools (which testifies to a new level of institutional attention to the topic 
of gender equality), and Italian society’s increasingly positive opinion on the 
recognition of same sex -unions in our national laws.15
The discourse opposing these developments is as effective as it is 
ambiguous: on the one hand, it refers to the constitutional definition of the 
family as “a natural society founded on marriage” (Article 29 of the Italian 
Constitution), thereby evoking the broad, general horizon of a common 
democratic order. Once again, the subject and target of communication is 
the People of the Family, defined as a majoritarian, broad social force 
14 The Italian Constitution, which entered into force after the Second World War with the com-
mencement of the new democratic, republican, system, defines the family as “a natural society 
founded on marriage” (Article 29), but does not explicitly specify the sex of the spouses.
15 The first (and until now the only) national survey on the “Italian homosexual population”, 
published by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in 2012, reports that 62.8% of the sample 
(which is statistically representative of the Italian population) agree with the sentence “It is right for 
a same -sex couple living together to have the same legal rights as a heterosexual married couple”. 
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associated with a constitutional dimension. In this discursive context, the cons- 
titutional element is crucial: it is a polysemic concept that is legal and onto-
logical and social and statutory at one and the same time. On the other 
hand, the strategy reduces the horizons of marriage (and, consequently, 
of the family), as it implicitly but invariably defines it as “heterosexual” by 
virtue of its connection with the argument of “nature”.
Moreover, in order to reinforce the populist “us vs. them” conflict, the 
People of the Family are construed as the victim of a public threat (Gender 
Ideology) that is directed in particular against the most vulnerable and innocent 
of targets: children. This is a common discursive strategy in the public debate 
on LGBTQ rights: public threat, moral corruption and moral panic, and the 
need to protect the innocence of children in a sort of “moral battle” against 
decadence (Robinson, 2008).
Finally, it should be noted that the main axis of the argument is constructed 
around the nature -culture dichotomy: this strategy admits a connection to be 
made between the topics of defending and educating children and same -sex 
unions. This association is made by reaffirming the existence of a clear separa-
tion between masculinity and femininity, which are conceived as “naturally” 
different and complementary dimensions generated by immeasurable phy- 
sical and psychological differences (the most important of which is the “natural” 
feminine vocation for motherhood and care).16
5. The Rome Human Pride: Between the LGBTQI Revolution and Normalization
The history of the Italian Pride Parade points to a series of shared general 
claims made by Italian LGBTQI movements, which can be briefly char-
acterized as issues relating to the sphere of sexual and gender citizenship: 
self -determination, the freedom and dignity of all sexual identities and orien- 
tations, the recognition of same -sex unions and marriages and the struggle 
against homo - and transphobia and gender -based violence. 
As we have mentioned, in recent years the Pride movement has changed 
its key message from “LGBTQI Pride” to “Onda Pride”, and in 2015 the 
movement converged in a series of demonstrations across the country using 
the slogan “It’s Human Pride!”. In analyzing the general manifesto, we noted 
an interesting change from previous Parades with regard to the political 
lexicon and the strategic claims adopted by the main LGBTQI groups at 
the national level.
16 This is the official position of the Catholic Church, expressed both in John Paul II’s Theology 
of Women and in the Pontifical Council’s Lexicon for the family, first published in 2003 (Pontifical 
Council for the Family, 2005).
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The first significant change has been the introduction of the term “Human”, 
which involves a series of epistemic and pragmatic tangles that traditionally 
surround the controversial relationships between difference and equality, 
rights and the law, and nature and culture from LGBTQI theoretical and 
political perspectives. This originates a political and cognitive shift towards 
universality, which over the last few years has become the new rhetorical 
argument used to generalize the LGBTQI condition as that of the so -called 
“universal human being” (Onda Pride National Manifesto, June 2015). 
This universalization of LGBTQI subjectivities and related civil and social 
rights has been described as a sort of strategic “normalization” (Croce, 
2015) of gender and sexual differences, aimed at recognizing equal civil and 
social rights for every citizen, regardless of specificities of gender and sexual 
orientation. The claims for integration and equality that Croce (ibidem) has 
called “conditional acceptance” of a “‘homolingual’ rights jargon” are typi-
cal of the universal citizenship framework. The fundamental pre condition 
for a request for acceptance within the bounds of citizens’ rights is accept-
ability itself, in the sense of a demonstration, by LGBTQI subjectivities, 
of respectability and compatibility with the main heteronormative system of 
rights (Seidman, 2001). In the national Human Pride document, this issue 
is described as a “common commitment and will to represent a resource 
for change and growth in the whole of society” (Onda Pride National 
Manifesto, June 2015). 
Nevertheless, a considerable ambivalence emerges from an analysis of 
both these documents with regard to the very concept of citizenship rights: 
what is being claimed, indeed, is, on the one hand, an acknowledgement of 
LGBTQI differences and, on the other, the recognition and integration 
of LGBTQI issues as universal (or “human”). 
This ambivalence between universalism (as a way of normalizing rights) 
and difference (in the form of a radical, revolutionary challenge to society) 
runs through both documents. It is associated with the lengthy debate within 
LGBTQI and feminist perspectives about equality and difference, in the 
sense of the relationship between subjectivity, rights and the law (Butler 
and Scott, 1992; Alcoff and Potter, 1993).
The “normalizing turn” of Human Pride coexists with a very radical per-
spective, which maintains the “subversive” challenge to the heteronormative 
social order associated with early LGBTQI movements. Indeed, a number of 
non -institutional LGBTQI groups have criticized the use of the “Human” 
label because it entails the disappearance of the potential for conflict that 
has historically been given voice by non -conformist gender differences in 
LGBTQI perspectives (Polikoff, 1993). 
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On the other hand, the document drafted by the Rome Pride organizing 
Committee, entitled “Liberiamoci!” (“Let’s Be Free!”), describes Pride 
Parades as “revolutionary acts” that aspire to a “deep and radical” change 
in society (Onda Pride Rome Manifesto, 13 June 2015). Pride is “liberation 
from stereotypes that limit social models, and impose precepts and unfair 
norms” that restrain the “multiplicity, non -conformity and dignity” of every 
“individual person” (ibidem); it criticizes the cultural construction of dif-
ferences as deviance from the (hetero)norm. The document attributes these 
different identities to the nature factor, which is the only element that is 
considered to be common to “human beings”: “diversity is the true natural 
condition of every human being, and is thus what we have most in common, 
beyond any label or belonging” (ibidem). Despite decades of critical feminist 
and LGBTQI movements and theories deconstructing the naturalization of 
sex and bodies, nature is viewed here as the “authenticity” of individuals. 
While human nature is asserted to be the common condition of all human 
beings, it is also used to define and legitimize their intrinsic differences.
The Human Pride 2015 national document denounces a “radicalization” of 
the conflict carried out by “minority conservative groups” (i.e. neoconserva-
tives) against LGBTQI people (ibidem). The document accuses Sentinelle in 
Piedi (“Vigil Keepers”), one of the most conservative and homophobe group 
affiliated to the Family Day organizing Committee, to fight against the legal 
recognition of LGBTQI people with “public demonstrations, parliamentary 
obstructionism, abuses of power and the sabotage of rights” (ibidem). These 
“attacks […] are waged against the lives of LGBTQI people, undermining 
their safety and that of the places in which they live” (ibidem). It is also worth 
to notice that the document describes this conflict as a “trench warfare”.
The use of such war -related terminology reinforces the sense of an on- 
going cultural and civil war, in which certain individuals (LGBTQI people) 
are attacked because of their different sexual identity and orientation and 
their lives are put at risk. The semantics of safety and security, and the risk 
to which LGBTQI people are exposed, run through the entire document, 
suggesting a dimension of victimization and criminalization. On the one 
hand, neoconservative and Catholic movements criminalize LGBTQI 
people because of their sexual orientation, while on the other, and as a con-
sequence, LGBTQI people feel that they are being victimized, persecuted 
and excluded from civil and social citizenship.
The sphere of citizenship includes the civil and social rights and the 
recognition that are being contested by neo conservative forces in respect 
of education, same -sex unions and the fight against homo - and transphobia. 
Indeed, according to Human Pride organizers, an “obscurantist ideology” 
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is threatening Italian society, starting with the public education system, 
through a new law on the so -called Buona Scuola (“Good School”).17 This is a 
centralizing piece of legislation that gives school principals decision -making 
powers in regards to programs and teacher selection, thus “increasing the 
risk of discrimination or pressure on teachers because of their sexual ori-
entation” (Onda Pride National Manifesto, June 2015). 
At the same time, education is being gravely damaged by the new law’s 
silence regarding gender education and the fight against bullying in public 
schools: 
this situation is the consequence of fundamentalist and aggressive public pronoun-
cements that, while accusing us of upsetting the foundations of civil cohabitation, 
the social structure, the family and educational models by fomenting the spread of a 
non -existent Gender Ideology, oppose any type of intervention against bullying and gen-
der violence at school, the real aim being to revitalize gender stereotypes, prejudices and 
obscurantism that are typical of the most vulgar kinds of patriarchy and sexism. (ibidem)
The response of the Pride Parade to this accusation has been to defend 
a “secular public school system” within an “integrated vision of society 
built on dialogue and the valuing of differences and solidarity” (Onda 
Pride National Manifesto, June 2015). Once again the discursive strategy 
of this LGBTQI initiative is aimed at reinforcing the idea of implementing 
integrationist and inoffensive actions by denying the “phantom” of Gender 
Ideology. Conversely, some feminist/queer activists and scholars (Zappino 
and Ardilli, 2015; Lolli, 2015) claimed the subversive potential of their 
perspectives that actually question the heteronormative construction of 
gender and the naturalization of sex. Therefore, for radical feminist think-
ing, denying the critical epistemology of Gender Studies by presenting it 
as a neutral social science is a misleading and weak attempt to defend these 
fields of studies (and activism) from the neo conservative attacks (for a more 
extensive discussion of the topic in Italian language, see Bellè et al., 2016). 
This same reassuring and integrationist dynamic would seem to character-
ize the responses to neo conservative criticism of the recognition of same -sex 
marriage and unions, which keeps Italy “very distant from the civil progress 
made by other countries in Europe” (Onda Pride Rome Manifesto, June 2015). 
While the national Human Pride document refers to the claims for same -sex 
17 The new law on schools was approved while this article was being written. It has been criticized 
by both teachers and students because of its authoritarian shift towards a situation where the selec-
tion of teachers and education programs are selected by school principals.
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marriage, civil unions and LGBTQI parenthood only in general terms, 
the issue is addressed in more detail in the Rome Pride document. While 
the draft law on civil unions (the Cirinnà Bill) provides a positive response 
to LGBTQI claims for “an approximation to heterosexual couples”, it actu-
ally “ratifies unacceptable discrimination and results that have already been 
made obsolete in the social realm” (ibidem). Although here the claim is for 
a kind of homology with the heterosexual and normative right to marriage, 
the Rome Pride also asks for the recognition of “polyamorous relation-
ships” and the “multiform reality of identities, relationships, families and 
childhood” contained in a final list of claims. Thus the Rome Pride docu-
ment insists on the claim for the recognition of all LGBTQI relationships 
outside the heteronormative form of relationship (the monogamous couple) 
while remaining within the heteronormative and inclusionist framework 
of the “equalization of rights and duties through the affirmation of a cul- 
ture of respect and inclusion” (ibidem). The ambivalence between a normal-
izing, integrationist position and a radical queer perspective is a political 
tangle that still remains unsolved within the LGBTQI debate and reflects 
the different positionings of the institutional and radical groups. 
6. Discussion: A Shared Discursive Frame
As has been pointed out in the two previous paragraphs, devoted to the 
analysis of the official documents of the two demonstrations (Family Day 
and Onda Pride), the Italian public debate on gender issues and LGBTQ 
rights has two opposing “fronts”. We have analyzed these two positions 
through the prism of two events that took place in the same city (Rome) 
in the same month (June 2015), and that can be viewed as representative of 
the current debate (especially since 2013). At this point it is important to 
summarize briefly the main characteristics of these two discourses, paying 
particular attention to their interconnections and reciprocal influences.
In spite of the manifest political opposition of the LGBTQ and 
conservative -Catholic fronts, our analysis identified a common, hegemonic 
discourse within the debate (van Dijk, 1993), based on what we define as 
a process of “naturalization”. In fact, the concept of “nature” emerges as a 
common framework used by both “fronts”, although with a different purpose. 
The differing concepts of nature, and therefore the definition of gender that 
derives from them, lead to disparate understandings of what the family is and 
divergent opinions on the educative role of the family and schools. Finally, 
they also identify the legitimate content of education itself.
On the one hand, the promoters of the Family Day conceive “nature” as 
a regulatory parameter that identifies separate and complementary forms of 
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“masculinity” and “femininity”. The Gender Ideology lobbies are threatening 
this “natural order”, but they do not have a sufficiently solid scientific basis 
to do so (i.e., a critique of the constructivist approach in science, depicted 
as ideological). True science, instead, is represented by the professionals 
of the Family Day Committee (“hard scientists”, such as doctors and psy-
chiatrists), who confirm the “natural order” and speak on the basis of solid 
scientific truth. It is important to notice that, according to this view, nature 
and culture are closely related and mutually supportive – or, to put it in 
other words, culture is “naturally determined”.
The positions of the LGBTQ Pride promoters, on the other hand, are 
more nuanced and ambivalent. They seem to share the “naturalization 
approach”, at least partially. According to their discursive construction, 
a person’s differences must be respected, because differences originate 
in the natural condition of every human being (therefore, differences are 
natural). Thus, it is only logical that LGBTQ rights are asserted within the 
general framework of human rights. However, the Onda Pride manifesto 
retains certain traces of a different argument, one that rejects nature as 
a framework. Following the influence of feminist and queer movements 
(which are also related to gender studies theories), the manifesto (re)affirms 
the socio cultural character of gender (Scott, 1986), defining it as a social 
process which cannot be reduced to a dichotomy between masculinity 
and femininity. In this case there is no precise, traditional family model 
or hetero normative framework. In fact, they start out from a “critical 
approach”, questioning the existing social order and claiming recognition 
for the plurality of configurations of relationships, identity, parenthood 
and childhood. It is interesting to note that these two positions seem to 
reproduce, under different circumstances and conditions, the historical 
fracture that occurred within the feminist movement between the equality 
and difference approaches. The Onda Pride discourse is therefore faced 
with a well -known political and philosophical dilemma, shared by a number 
of other so -called  minority movements.
As a final point in our comparison of the two discourses, mention should 
also be made of the most highly debated issue of the past few months, 
in which Gender Ideology was the main actor. Taking as their point of 
departure a discussion on the legitimization of gender education programs, 
the neo conservative Catholic movement has introduced and demonized the 
so -called Gender Ideology issue – and its “lobbies”.
In this case, it is possible to identify two clearly opposite opinions that 
correspond to those expressed by the promoters of the events. In this 
regard, the LGBTQ movement has not expressed a different point of view. 
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On the one hand, the Family Day promoters proclaim the supremacy of 
the educative role of the family, which must also have the opportunity 
to intervene in school teaching programs, thereby maintaining the fam-
ily’s absolute primacy over children’s education. Using this belief as their 
starting point, the Catholic movements began a campaign – supported by 
the Family Day event organizers – against the dissemination and institu-
tionalization of educational programs on gender and affectivity in Italian 
schools (because of the dangers presented by Gender Ideology to the 
hetero normative social model).
The Pride promoters, on the other hand, defend the importance of qual-
ity, secular, public schools, and support the dissemination and institutional- 
ization of gender education programs, which they consider to be crucial for 
tackling gender -based violence, bullying and homophobia and overcoming 
gender and sexual orientation stereotypes and prejudices.
Concluding Remarks: The Dilemma of Contemporary Citizenship and the 
Siren Call of “Nature”
By way of conclusion, it is important to identify the most profound and rele-
vant core of the debate under analysis. This is a very significant and structural 
issue, having to do with the redefinition of the paradigm of citizenship, which 
is being radically contested by new claims for recognition. The debate we 
have analyzed above is indeed ultimately concerned with the access to social 
and civil rights by categories of people who have hitherto been excluded from 
them. What we have here, then, is the need for a redefinition of the general 
paradigm of gendered and sexual citizenship (what kinds of affective and 
family relationships should be recognized as being a part of the social system, 
citizenship and welfare). This claim for recognition encompasses not only 
emotional relationships (whether homosexual, heterosexual, or any other 
kind), but also the very concept of personal gender identity, the definition of 
masculinity and femininity, and whatever types of social gender practices 
are considered to be socially, politically and legally legitimate. 
This point is crucial, firstly in terms of a transformation of our model 
of contemporary citizenship. Marriage and “the family” are, in fact, two 
fundamental elements of citizenship (which are still culturally hegemonic in 
Italy), because the status acquired through these institutions permits access 
to certain rights from which citizens are otherwise excluded. In addition, 
using the concept of citizenship as a conceptual lens for interpreting the 
debate allows a more profound understanding of the internal differences that 
have emerged in the LGBTQ movement. Pursuing a sort of “assimilative 
approach”, some LGBTQ groups are fighting for full access to marriage and 
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integration into the dominant model. In this regard it is worth noting that, 
although civil unions were officially approved by the Italian Parliament in 
May 2016 (11 months after we conducted our discourse analysis), they remain 
a sort of second -class partnership, not fully comparable, in terms of rights 
and duties, to civil heterosexual marriage. This qualitative distinction was 
one of the most controversial points in the parliamentary debate. Moreover, 
the final approval of same sex unions was possible only on the basis of this 
qualitative differentiation and hierarchization that, in sociological terms, can 
be interpreted as reparatory work. However, as was pointed out in our tex-
tual analysis, there is another faction within the LGBTQ movement that has 
shifted from a “critical approach” toward a claim of universal citizenship (in 
the sense of a guarantee of access to rights by virtue of citizenship). This part 
of the movement reaffirms a refusal to be incorporated into and to conform 
to the existing patriarchal, heteronormative social order (Josephson, 2005).
In conclusion, it is important to note how, in this recent phase of Italy’s 
long debate on same sex unions (Ozzano and Giorgi, 2015) and civil rights, 
the various opinions that marked public discourse have become increasingly 
radicalized. Until now, in fact, when similar proposals (draft bills on the 
recognition of same -sex couple partnerships) were discussed, the reaction 
of neo conservative groups within the Catholic movement had prevalently 
focused on rejection and denial. Nowadays, however, these groups have 
opted for a prevalent focus on the defense of the status quo by using the 
broader conceptual apparatus of gender relations and of masculinity and 
femininity. Thus the neoconservative Catholic movement has shifted the 
discursive focus from criticism of same -sex unions (which could be labelled 
as homophobic and therefore criticized in the public debate) to the “natural” 
status of masculinity and femininity. In this respect, the social model and 
the political perspective that make up their position might even be defined 
as reactionary. They have embarked on a shift to the right in their public 
discourse, and in some ways this has also influenced the LGBTQ movement, 
which has developed an ambivalent discourse that, although retaining traces 
of the constructivist approach, seems – at least partially – to have succumbed 
to the siren call of “nature”.
Revised by João Paulo Moreia
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A luta pela cidadania (sexual):  
o dilema italiano entre “natureza  
e cultura”
O debate público tem sido recentemente 
marcado em Itália por um renovado inte-
resse pelas questões de género e cidadania 
sexual. Mais especificamente, destacam -se 
dois discursos políticos antagónicos envol-
vidos numa longa contenda que sintetizam 
e simbolizam claramente este debate. 
De um lado encontra-se o movimento cató-
lico neoconservador que se opõe ao reco-
nhecimento das relações LGBTQ e defende 
a “família natural”. Do outro, os movi-
mentos LGBT, que reivindicam a plena 
cidadania civil, social e sexual. No pre- 
sente artigo analisa -se este conflito, que se 
manifestou muito claramente por ocasião 
de dois eventos públicos que tiveram lugar 
em Roma em junho de 2015: o Dia da 
Família e a Marcha do Orgulho LGBTQI. 
Através de uma metodologia baseada na 
Análise Crítica do Discurso, examinam -se 
os documentos políticos mais relevantes 
(manifestos e comunicados de imprensa) 
Le combat pour la citoyenneté 
(sexuelle): le dilemme italien entre 
“nature et culture”
En Italie, le débat public a récemment 
été marqué par un regain d’intérêt envers 
les questions de genre et de citoyenneté 
sexuelle. Plus spécifiquement, il existe 
deux discours politiques antagoniques 
engagés dans une longue dispute qui 
synthétisent et symbolisent clairement ce 
débat. D’un côté, nous trouvons le mou-
vement catholique néoconservateur qui 
s’oppose à la reconnaissance des relations 
LGBTQ et défend la “famille naturelle”. 
De l’autre, il existe des mouvements 
LGBT, qui revendiquent la pleine citoyen-
neté civile, sociale et sexuelle. Dans cet 
article nous nous penchons sur l’analyse de 
ce conflit, qui s’est clairement manifesté à 
l’occasion de deux évènements publics qui 
eurent lieu à Rome en juin 2015: la Journée 
de la Famille et la Marche des Fiertés 
LGBTQI. En passant par une méthodo-
logie qui repose sur l’Analyse Critique du 
Discours, nous examinons les documents 
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emitidos pelos organizadores dos dois 
eventos e destaca -se a presença de dis-
cursos ambivalentes sobre a naturalização 
do sexo e a universalização da cidadania 
social e sexual.
Palavras -chave: Análise Crítica do Dis- 
curso; cidadania sexual; identidade de 
género; Itália; movimento LGBT.
politiques les plus importants (manifestes 
et communiqués de presse) émis par les 
organisateurs des deux évènements et 
nous soulignons la présence de discours 
ambigus sur la naturalisation du sexe et 
l’universalisation de la citoyenneté sociale 
et sexuelle.
Mots -clés: Analyse Critique du Discours; 
citoyenneté sexuelle; identité dé genre; 
Italie; mouvement LGBTQ.

